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 MICROFINANCE STRATEGIES: 
 
STRATEGIES FOR DEVELOPING VIABLE MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS 
WITH SUSTAINABLE SERVICES 
 
- The Asian Experience - 
 
 
I.  Sustainable Microfinance for All 
 
The role of the state:  deregulation and prudential regulation 
 
In most developing countries, access to financial services by all segments of the 
population, including low-income people, is a matter of growing concern. Many governments 
have responded positively to this concern by embarking on financial system reform. They have 
attempted to match people’s demand for adequate financial services with the government’s 
responsibility for macroeconomic stability and a sound financial infrastructure. This endeavor 
includes:  
 
•  deregulating the interest rate (or profit-sharing) regime;  
•  adjusting the legal environment and create appropriate legal forms for MFIs;  
•  transforming financial institutions into profitable intermediaries between savers and investors;  
•  providing opportunities for local people to establish their own local financial institutions; 
•  encouraging sound banking practices.  
 
  However, these noble objectives have not been always pursued with the necessary 
vigor. This, at least, is the chief lesson from the Asian financial crisis, which is rooted in: 
 
•  hazardous, politically instigated lending;  
•  inadequate internal resource mobilization and unhedged external debts; and, above all,  
•  inadequate regulation and supervision of financial institutions. 
 
As a result of soaring inflation rates, many poor people have lost their savings and, due to the 
illiquidity of financial institutions, their access to credit has been curtailed. The devasting effects 
of the recent financial crisis in East and Southeast Asia have lent additional emphasis to  the 
crucial question  of  how to promote and prudentially regulate viable financial 
institutions with sustainable financial services with an outreach to all segments of the 
population including low-income people, in order to prevent such a financial crisis in other 
countries. 
 
Key concepts in microfinance 
 
Microfinance  is defined as a sector of formal, semiformal and informal financial 
institutions,  providing financial services to the microeconomy. These services consist of 
microsavings and microcredit (and perhaps other financial services such as microinsurance, 
leasing, transfer services), thereby allocating scarce resources to microinvestments with the 
highest marginal rates of return. Two types of institutions are involved: 
 
•  in a narrow sense, small local financial institutions; 
•  in a wider sense, national or regional banks and development finance institutions (DFIs) with 
microfinance services for small savers and borrowers. 
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The Microeconomy is the primary market of MFIs and includes target populations such as 
microentrepreneurs, small farmers and the landless, women and low-income people. It does not 
necessarily exclude other segments of the population. 
 
Viability, sustainability and outreach 
 
Viability refers to the extent to which an institution covers its costs, has its loans repaid, 
and makes a profit; whereas  sustainability refers to the extent to which an institution, in 
addition to being viable, mobilizes its own financial resources internally (equity, savings deposits, 
and retained profits) instead of depending on government or donor resources. Finally, outreach 
refers to the extent to which all segments of the population, including low-income people, have 




The greatest challenge for MFIs lies in the combination of viability and sustainability with 
outreach. The core development issue to be addressed, however, is how best to develop the 
financial system: 
 
•  in the interest of all segments of the population including low-income people; and 
•  in the interest of institutional viability and sustainability, 
 
as only viable and sustainable MFIs belonging to a sound financial system will be able to 
guarantee adequate access to financial services for all segments of the population. 
 
Strategic approaches to the development of microfinance  
 
  There are three principal approaches for enhancing the effectiveness of the financial 
system and its services to the microeconomy: 
 
•  the regulatory reform approach:  
to improve the policy and regulatory environment, including the framework of bank and MFI 
supervision, in which MFIs operate; 
 
•  the institutional transformation approach:  
to improve the financial infrastructure and the microeconomy’s access to it; and 
 
•  the sound practices
1 approach:  
to improve the effectiveness of financial institutions with microfinancial services. 
 
 
  While the various approaches are interrelated within an overall financial systems 
context, each one can be chosen as a separate entry point for development interventions. Even 
in a repressive regulatory environment, sound practices such as appropriate loan sizes and 
instalment periods or positive incentives to repay on time, can be feasible. However, the ultimate 
effectiveness of interventions focussing on institutional transformation and sound banking 
practices will vary considerably, depending on the appropriateness of the policy environment. 
 
                                                                 
1   The World Bank uses the term best practices,  which I consider as misleading as it evokes the notion of 
ideal and universally valid solutions. This may result in uncritical replication of models and practices 
which may work well in the cultural setting of their origin but not necessarily, or at least not without 
adaptation, in other environments.  
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II.  The regulatory reform approach:  strategies for creating an appropriate policy and 
regulatory framework 
 
  Microfinance is part of a country's wider financial system. Three reform measures are 
of crucial importance to the development of viable institutions with sustainable microfinancial 
services:  
 
(a)  the deregulation of interest or profit-sharing rates on deposits and loans: 
permitting each institution to adjust its profit-sharing or interest rate structure to its costs, 
including the costs of serving marginal clients in remote areas, of collecting microsavings 
and microinstalments, and of doorstep services; 
 
(b)  a revision of the banking law:  
  facilitating the establishment of a wide branch network of banks, creating a variety of 
legal forms for financial institutions with different capital requirements, and permitting 
local people to establish their own small financial institutions, with special provisions for 
nonformal MFIs and their transformation into formal institutions.  
 
  In addition, the legal system should provide for alienable private land use rights 
or land ownership titles as a basis of collateral and for the efficient processing of claims 
arising from bad debts. 
 
(c)  The provision of effective MFI supervision:  
  providing guidance and supervision to institutions with microfinancial services in the 
interest of both the MFIs and their customers. In the case of a multitude of small local 
microfinance institutions, such supervision may be provided by a separate second-tier 
regulatory authority.  
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Indonesia: 
Financial deregulation without adequate supervision 
 
1.  Financial deregulation: a story of success 
In Asia, Indonesia has served as a model case for the deregulation of the policy and legal framework since 
1983, paralleled by macroeconomic stability and the deregulation of the foreign trade regime. This resulted 
in considerable financial deepening: an upsurge of domestic savings mobilization, credit disbursement, 
number of banking institutions, and outreach. The upsurge has been most impressive in microfinance. 
Deregulation of the monetary and banking system proceeded in the following steps: 
•  1983:  Interest rate autonomy is given to all banks, state-owned and private. Bank Indonesia (BI) as the 
central bank drops direct interest rate controls and adopts market-oriented monetary policies. Between 
1983 and 1990 savings mobilization increased 6.7-fold, bank loans outstanding 6.4-fold. From 1990 to 
1995 savings mobilization increased 2.5-fold, bank loans outstanding 2.4-fold. 
•  1988:  BI deregulates the institutional framework by easing the establishment of new banks and the 
opening of branches. A new rural banking law permits the establishment of rural banks (BPR) with an 
equity capital of Rp. 50 million, requiring the existing semiformal financial institutions to be eventually 
transformed into banks (BPR). 1,643 rural banks (BPR) were established until 1995. The total number 
of registered small financial institutions grew from 8,003 in 1990 to 9,271 in 1995; the number of 
commercial banks from 171 to 240; and the number of their branches from 3,563 to 5,191. 
•  1990:  BI withdraws most of the interest rate subsidies. Commercial banks are required to allocate at 
least 20% of their portfolio to the microeconomy, either directly or through MFIs. 
•  1991:  In response to some spectacular bank failures, BI steps up bank supervision and imposes a 
capital adequacy ratio. 
•  1992:  A new banking act deregulates bank ownership. Only two types of banks are recognized: 
commercial banks und rural banks (BPR) with a paid-in capital of Rp10b (US$. 4.82m, at 1992 
exchange rates) and Rp50m ($24,100), respectively. 
 
2.  Inadequate supervision: a story of failure 
Weaknesses in bank supervision had been apparent all along, to which BI responded in 1991, though 
ineffectively. The fact of politically instigated lending was also known, but not its excessive extent. The 
belief was upheld that in a climate of rapid economic growth, the healthy portion of the bank’s portfolio 
might outgrow the sick portion, but this was erroneous.  
 
3.  Lessons learned 
Three regulatory reform measures are essential for sustained financial and economic growth: prudential 
deregulation, macroeconomic stability, and effective bank supervision. Indonesia performed well on 
deregulation and stability, but failed on bank supervison. This, in the wider framework of the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997, led to a bank run, the collapse of the Rupiah, soaring inflation, massive 
unemployment, and, last not least, political instability. Microfinance was least affected, indicating that at 
the local level, MFIs were more successful in sound banking and the avoidance of political influence. The 
chief lesson of the Indonesian experience is that financial deregulation without adequate bank supervision 




III.  The institutional transformation approach:  Strategies for developing viable MFIs 
 
The financial infrastructure:  In many countries, there is a variety of financial institutions 
with national and local outreach, each with its own comparative advantages for microfinancial 
services at the local level:  
 
•  formal institutions which fall under the banking law, including agricultural banks, development  
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banks, commercial banks, private shareholding banks, finance companies, leasing companies, 
and sometimes village or rural banks;  
•  semiformal institutions authorized by some government agency, including savings and credit 
cooperatives, NGOs and various projects and programs; and  
•  informal institutions beyond the purview of government agencies, including rotating and non-
rotating savings and credit associations, community-owned fund-raising and credit 
arrangements and other types of self-help groups. 
 
  Institutional transformation strategies:  Depending on the existence and vigor of 
such institutions in a given area, four major institutional transformation strategies have emerged, 
offering strategic entry points for microfinance development:  
 
  (1)  Adapting (downscaling) formal financial institutions to the needs of the 
microeconomy. 
  (2)  Upgrading (upscaling) nonformal (comprising semiformal and informal) financial 
institutions. 
  (3)  Linking formal and nonformal financial institutions, or banks and self-help 
groups. 
  (4)  Establishing new local financial institutions with microfinancial services. 
 
  The first three strategies may be inter-connected:  
 
•  adapting banks to the requirements of the microeconomy in a first step; then  
•  linking them as wholesale institutions to self-help groups as retailers; and finally, 
•  upgrading self-help groups e.g. to the level of financial cooperatives or village banks. 
 
  Profit-sharing or interest rate fexibility as a prerequisite:The prime prerequisite and at 
the same time crucial policy incentive for institutional transformation is a profit-sharing or interest 
rate regime which allows for market oriented interest rates. Banks must be permitted to price 
their products appropriately to cover their fixed and variable costs and include an adequate profit 
margin. If banks are to serve customers which differ widely in terms of service costs and risks, 
the only viable inducement for them is an adequate margin, lest they exclude small farmers, -
microentrepreneurs and people in remote areas. A sense of moral obligation is usually not 
sufficient. Only sound social banking, which combines a social mandate with profit-making, has a 
chance of sustainability. 
 
  In the absence of this prime prerequisite banks may pursue one of the following three 
courses: they may request an exemption from the central bank; they may externalize part of their 
costs by working through intermediaries with separate funding (e.g. NGOs); or they may set up 
a non-bank organization with a separate legal personality (e.g., a limited liability company) which 
does not fall under the interest rate regulations of the banking law. However, these approaches 
should only be transitory; they are no long-term substitute for interest rate deregulation.  
 
 
Formal finance and the institutional adaptation 
2 strategy 
 
  Existing agricultural, development and commercial banks frequently have a potential for 
adjustment to the financial requirements of the microeconomy. Tapping this vast potential is a 
major challenge for the member institutions of NENARACA.  Institutional adaptation of banks 
to the microfinance market and the downscaling of their operations concerns the following areas: 
                                                                 
2   The institutional adaptation strategy is also referred to as institutional downscaling or downgrading  
strategy.  
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(1) their delivery system; (2) their corporate culture; (3) their internal business and product 
policy; (4) bank procedures; (5) terms and conditions; (6) risk management; (7) crisis prevention; 
(8) the manpower and training system; and (9) the transformation of their ownership structure 
and governance. 
 
(1)  Delivery system: 
  Adapting the delivery system of a bank may comprise four major avenues towards 
microfinance, all geared to one tenet, bringing the bank to the people: 
  n extending the  branch and sub-branch network;  
  n establishing part-time offices in villages, markets or small industry sites;  
  n mobile services through cars, motorcycles, bicycles, or on foot; 
  n full-time or part-time agents providing doorstep or other decentralized services.  
 
(2)   Corporate culture:  
  Adapting the corporate culture at the local level requires:  
  n an a djustment of the bank's material culture (such as the appearance of the bank 
building and its offices, types of vehicles,  facilities such as air-conditioning);  
  n social culture (such as social background, dress code, language and behavior of staff 
as well as quality of staff-customer relations); and  
  n the bank's value orientation system (comprising values such as honesty and reliability, 
diligence and hard work, innovativeness, social responsibility, being of service to the 
customer, making the bank grow).  
  This customer-oriented corporate culture must be internalized through staff training and 
propagated through public relations as the bank's image. 
 
(3)  Business and product policy:  
  Adapting the banks' business and product policy requires a reorientation towards 
savings- and demand-driven sound banking. This comprises in particular:  
  n an orientation of a bank towards cost coverage and institutional viability,  
  n market and customer-oriented banking and  
  n self-reliance through mobilization of i ts own funds of which  savings are the most 
important source in the field of microfinance.  
 
  This reorientation is to be operationalized through:  
  n appropriate savings and credit products; and 
  n reciprocal savings-cum-credit schemes,  
  which are all designed to bring the mutual business interests of the banks and their 
customers into balance. 
 
(4)   Bank procedures: 
  Adapting procedures requires:  
  n a simplification of forms and procedures,  
  n convenient facilities and banking hours, 
  n customer-oriented services of high quality and reliability, including 
  n timely delivery and collection services, 
  n doorstep services, 
  n daily savings collection, 
   n creditworthiness examination and collateral requirements adjusted to the needs of 
small customers. 
 
(5)  Terms and conditions:   
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  Adapting terms and conditions to the requirements of microentrepreneurs and informal 
sector households comprises:  
  n an emphasis on small sizes of savings, loans and installments (downscaling); 
  n a differentiation of terms according to area or customer groups with different risk and 
cost structures;   
  n a differentiation of terms according to the length and quality of the business 
relationship, including a difference in terms between initial and subsequent repeat 
loans;   
  n variable but short maturities;  
  n frequent instalments;  
  n no or short grace periods. 
 
(6)   Risk management:  
  Adapting risk management comprises a comprehensive strategy for arrears prevention, 
including:  
  n appropriate loan terms;  
  n reliance on a borrower's track record based on savings and previous loan repayment; 
  n appropriate forms of collateral, if any, including nonformal collateral substitutes; 
  n personal guarantees; and  
  n various forms of joint liability in cooperation with self-help groups; 
  n insistence on timely (re-) payment. 
 
(7)  Crisis prevention: 
  In addition to good risk management, crisis prevention may entail the following: 
  n solid equity capital base and conservative capital equity ratio, 
  n reliance on internal resources rather than government or donor funds,  
  n strict adherence to principles of honoring one’s obligations, including legal action 
against defaulters; 
  n monitoring of portfolio quality and of the value of collateral; 
.   n precautions against undue influence by local authorities, politicians and the powerful 
on-lending decisions (e.g., repeat loans starting with small short-term loans; regular 
prior savings before acceptance of loan applications; insistence that funds deposited 
as required savings are self-generated and not borrowed; transparency of 
transactions). 
 
(8)  Manpower development and training system: 
  Adapting the manpower and training system requires:  
  n a selection of staff with particular language and social skills, which may be more 
important than formal certification, and  
  n inclusion of customer-oriented social behaviour, microloan appraisal and arrears 
prevention in the training curriculum. 
 
  This may further include:  
  n exposure training programs for bank executives and management in other banks, 
perhaps in neighbouring countries, which can serve as examples of successful 
adaptation. 
 
(9)  Transformation into separate local institutions: 
  Development banks or national agricultural bank activities which are plagued by a lack 
of dynamism, high costs and low repayment rates can be salvaged through privatization 
of their small farmer and microenterprise lending operations, e.g.:  
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  n as member-owned local banks or semiformal financial institutions; 
  n as community-owned local banks or semiformal financial institutions; 
  n as private shareholding banks. 
  Experience shows that this can greatly enhance local resource mobilization, repayment 
behaviour, institutional viability, volume and quality of services, outreach, and people's 
participation. 
 
  Limitations:  Formal financial institutions serve but a fraction of the population, which 
typically lies within the upper quartile of the social hierarchy. Through adaptation to the 
microfinance market requirements, they may gradually expand into the second-highest quartile 
and into segments of the lower quartiles. Within the foreseeable future they will normally not be 
able to fully serve that market.  To reach the whole market, the institutional downscaling strategy 
for formal financial institutions may be complemented by an upgrading strategy for nonformal 




Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI): 
an agricultural development bank with viable and sustainable microfinance operations 
 
1.  The failure of subsidized targeted credit - in a repressive policy environment 
Until 1983, century-old BRI was a major provider of subsidized targeted credit through 3,300 bank units 
(unit desa) and a staff of 14,300 in rural areas. Heavy losses resulting from poor repayment rates (around 
40%), plus fiscal cuts, had made the bank unsustainable.  
 
2.  Making microfinance viable – in a deregulated policy environment 
After the financial deregulation of June 1983, the government as the bank‘s owner decided to 
commercialize its operations by transforming the units into self-sustaining profit-centers. With TA from the 
Harvard Institute for International Development, the bank calculated microsavings and microcredit 
transaction costs and carefully crafted two commercial products: a rural savings scheme with a lottery 
component (SIMPEDES) which proved to be immensely attractive; and a nontargeted credit scheme 
(KUPEDES) open to all: with simple procedures, short maturities, regular monthly instalments, flexible 
collateral requirements, incentives for timely repayment, and market rates of interest amounting to 2% flat 
per month (equal to an effective rate of 44% p.a., minus 11% for timely repayment = 33% p.a.) to cover 
all costs and risks. Nominal interest rates were drastically higher than the previous subsidized rates of 
around 12%, but much less so in actual fact as under-the-table payments had all but disappeared. As of 
1984, all of BRI‘s village units were turned into profit centers with profit-sharing incentives for staff and 
penalties for excessive arrears for managers in terms of loss of credit authority. Programs carried out on 
behalf of the government and of donors were kept from the village units and confined to the branch level. 
During 2/1984-12/1996, a total of 18.47m loans had been made, with a long term loss ratio (total overdue 
one day or more, including amounts written off, divided by total which has fallen due during 2/1994-
12/1996) of 2.15%; and a 12-month loss ratio of 1.59% for 1-12/1996. Total payments in arrears one day 
or more as a percentage of total loans outstanding as of Dec. 31, 1996, excluding write-offs, amounted to 
3.64%. Consolidated profits at unit level amounted in 1996 to $177m, or 10.4% of loans outstanding. 
 
3.  Making microfinance sustainable – by responding to the demand for depositing savings 
With this model, BRI became one of the most successful rural-mandate banks in Asia-Pacific. With 
liquidity first provided by the World Bank, BRI broke even in 1990: fully mobilizing its loanable funds 
through village-level savings and generating excess resources thereafter. Since then, BRI‘s unit desa 
network has been completely self-reliant (mobilizing its own resources) and viable (covering its costs from 
the margin and making a profit). As of 31 Dec. 1996, BRI served 2.49m borrowers with a total amount of 
loans outstanding of US$1.71b (1996 exchange rate); and 16.17m depositors with savings balances of 
$2.97b. The ratio of borrowers to savers of 1:6.5 is an indication of the strong demand of rural people for 
deposit facilities, far in excess of the demand for credit.  
 
4.  Outreach of national BRI vs. local MFIs 
BRI, with 3,482 village units as of 12/1995, outperformed the totality of 1,948 formal (BPR) and 7,413 
semiformal MFIs, mobilizing Rp6.02tr from 14.48m savers compared to Rp1.45tr mobilized by 9,361 MFIs 
from 4.60m savers; and providing Rp 3.19tr to 2.26m borrowers, compared to Rp1.88tr provided by MFIs 
to 2.45m borrowers. BRI has demonstrated that in a deregulated policy environment, a government-owned 
agricultural development bank is capable of serving vast numbers of microsavers and microborrowers at 
market rates, mobilizing its resources internally, covering its costs, and financing its own expansion. In a 




Nonformal finance and the institutional upgrading strategy 
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  Approaches with or without legal status:  Nonformal finance mostly rests on local 
institutions which are directly accessible to all segments of the population. There are two 
principal approaches: (1) organizational development without the adoption of legal status; (2) 
transition of an institution to a higher order legal form, such as a credit cooperative, finance 
company, rural bank or private development bank. 
 
  These two approaches may be directed at enhancing the capacity of (1) grassroots 
financial institutions including self-help groups or  people's organizations; (2) self-help 
promoting institutions like non-governmental development organizations (NGDOs) or 
governmental development organizations (GDOs).  
 
(1)  Self-help groups (SHGs): 
  SHGs are member-owned and member-controlled local institutions. They may either be 
financial groups, with financial intermediation as their primary purpose, such as savings 
and credit associations; or nonfinancial groups, with financial intermediation as a 
secondary purpose, such as vendors' associations, craft guilds, family planning groups 
and numerous other types of voluntary associations.  
 
  Functions of SHGs: 
  Functions that may be enhanced through development assistance may include: 
  n providing guidance to members 
  n collecting savings from members 
  n building up an internal loan fund 
  n loan appraisal and creditworthiness examination 
  n financial consultancy services to members 
  n arranging for nonformal collateral or guarantees including joint liability 
  n granting loans to members 
  n size and term transformation 
  n collecting instalments 
  n applying social control mechanisms to enforce repayment 
  n granting emergency loans  
  n granting nonfinancial emergency assistance 
  n providing insurance services 
  n communication and exchange of experience 
  n providing linkages with banks, NGOs or donors 
  n supporting the loan applications of individual members to banks through 
recommendations. 
 
  Weaknesses:  While the activities of SHGs are usually well-adapted to local conditions, 
they frequently lack technical skills, networking capacities and access to sources of refinance.  
 
  Prevention of undue political influence:  MFIs can be subject to undue influence on 
lending decisions by local politicians or the powerful. This may be prevented by some of the 
following means:  
 
•  insistence on minimum length of membership of one year;  
•  regular participation in monthly meetings;  
•  repeat loans starting with very small short-term loans;  
•  regular prior savings before acceptance of loan applications;  
•  transparency in all transactions. 
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  The feasibility of bank status for SHGs:  The possibility and appropriateness of 
acquiring bank status by SHGs depends on the legal framework and on their financial and 
organizational maturity. In countries with an appropriate legal framework, financial SHGs may 
be assisted in establishing a bank owned and controlled by members. In countries without such a 
framework, SHGs may be assisted in establishing a non-bank institution until the law is changed. 
In cases where an SHG cannot immediately fulfil the conditions of the banking law, acquisition 
of a non-bank legal status, e.g. under cooperative law, association law, etc., may provide an 
interim solution which permits a SHG to undergo a process of upgrading until it is mature enough 
for bank status. In countries with effective savings and credit cooperatives, the feasibility of 
converting them into cooperative banks must be carefully examined. In countries where 
cooperatives have failed to mature into viable financial institutions (e.g., as a result of credit 
conducting on behalf of the government), rehabilitation with the objective of transforming them 
into viable institutions under the supervision of the central bank may provide a feasible alternati-
ve. This would in turn require massive technical assistance.  
 
(2)  Governmental and non-governmental development organizations: 
   GDOs and NGDOs may be established and supported by government or humanitarian 
organizations, relying on donor support and working for the benefit of others such as 
self-help groups and microentrepreneurs or small farmers. Or they may be apex or 
umbrella organizations of financial self-help groups, business associations and the like 
working for the benefit of their own members. The latter are, or may be, 
member-owned and member-directed, the former are not. Examples of the latter are 
regional and national federations of credit cooperatives, craft unions or market vendors 
associations. While their start-up phase may be donor-supported, they are to be 
financially self-reliant in the long run, drawing on their own resources or those of their 
members.   
 
  Functions of development organizations as financial intermediaries: 
  GDOs and NGDOs acting directly as financial intermediaries or working through 
financial self-help groups may have two basic functions: (i) guidance, training and 
consultancy in financial and nonfinancial matters; (ii) acting as a financial intermediary 
between microentrepreneurs or their self-help groups and donors or banks.  
 
  The activities of GDOs and NGDOs as financial intermediaries may include any of the 
following: 
  n financial extension services 
  n bookkeeping training 
  n financial management training 
  n providing innovative savings schemes, e.g. daily or doorstep savings collection in the 
informal sector, withdrawable voluntary savings as well as time deposits in self-help 
groups (SHGs), etc. 
  n mediating contacts with a bank or donor 
  n collecting and safekeeping savings 
  n depositing savings of microentrepreneurs of SHGs in a bank 
  n examining the creditworthiness of microentrepreneurs or SHGs 
  n negotiating bank loans for microentrepreneurs or SHGs 
  n onlending to microentrepreneurs or SHGs 
  n collecting installments from microentrepreneurs or SHGs 
  n bearing the credit risk 
  n repaying bank loans 
 
  Functions of development organizations as nonfinancial intermediaries:  GDOs  
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and NGDOs not acting as financial intermediaries may still carry out several of these functions, 
except concluding loan contracts and bearing the credit risk. For NGDOs acting directly or 
indirectly as financial intermediaries it is mandatory to possess an adequate accounting system, 
financial management skills and financial reserves to absorb arrears and bear the risk. For DOs 
which strengthen financial capacities of microentrepreneurs or SHGs it is mandatory to possess 
adequate training and consultancy capacities. This in turn requires major i nstitutional 
enhancement inputs from donors, as most DOs lack the required skills and capacities. 
 
  Bank status for development organizations acting as financial intermediaries:  
DOs acting as financial intermediaries are strongly encouraged to opt for banking status or 
otherwise formalize their financial operations. In actual fact, they may:  
 
  (1) contribute to the bankability of their target group (individuals or SHGs) and turn their 
financial operations over to suitable banks;  
  (2) establish their own bank operating along sound banking principles;  
  (3) establish a bank jointly with the SHGs or microentrepreneurs under their guidance. In 
the latter case, the DO may either consider its engagement in banking permanent or 
transitory, with the intention of eventually turning ownership and management over to 
the SHGs or microentrepreneurs.  
 
  Upgrading assistance:  The upgrading of nonformal financial institutions or operations 
of DOs and SHGs into member-based banks operating along sound banking criteria may be a 
major field of technical assistance.  
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Nepal: 
From informal to formal finance – from RoSCA to finance company 
 
1.  From RoSCA... 
Rotating savings and credit associations (RoSCAs) are, next to the moneylender, the most prevalent type 
of informal finance around the world. A group of people contribute a fixed amount each and, in a monthly, 
weekly, daily or other rotation, turn the total amount over to (mostly) one member at a time. At the end of 
a cycle, the group dissolves and may reorganize with a new membership. In many countries RoSCAs have 
turned into permanent nonrotating credit associations with their own loan funds. Most have stayed 
informal; but some have adopted the legal status of a cooperative society. In Nepal, however, the dhikur 
(sg.) or dhikuti (pl.) as they are called here, took a different course. Centuries ago, they first originated 
among the Thakali as a social insurance institution to protect these trading communities against the 
vicissitudes of the trans-Himalaya trade. During the past fifty years, they turned into small enterprise 
financing institutions and spread to virtually all cities of Nepal. In some dhikuti, monthly collections amount 
to thousands of dollars. With a growing demand for scarce financial resources, funds were allocated by 
bidding; e.g., the lowest bidder may accept a pot of $1000 at $600, returning the balance of $400 to the 
participants. In recent years, improvident speculation has led to cases of defaulting and greatly damaged 
the reputation of the dhikuti.  
 
2.  ...with daily savings collection at doorsteps... 
In 1989, H. B. Pradhananga, then a government employee, organized three dhikuti of 25 members each. 
He introduced several innovations: a long-term contractual savings scheme, with daily contributions of 
Rp10 (appr. US$0.16 at the 4/1998 exchange rate of US$1 = Rp63) for three years, which attracted low-
income people; daily collection at doorsteps through a collector rather than at regular meetings; and access 
to credit at any time. Despite the absence of legal status, the number of groups rose to 200 with 5,000 
participants within a year.  
 
3.  ...to finance company... 
Deregulation after 1990 created a fertile ground for financial innovations in Nepal. After the enactment of 
the Finance Company Act in 1992, H B. Pradhananga took a big step on the evolutionary scale of 
organizational morphogenesis: he registered his business as the  Himalaya Finance and Savings  
Company Ltd., HFSC. The new legal status created enough confidence for the participants to abandon 
the group structure. By May 1996, HFSC comprised 49 branches all over the country and with 600 daily 
deposit collectors, each serving 125-400 clients. Due to new regulation, the number of branches, including 
the headoffice, was subsequently reduced to six, and the remaining units were transformed into collection 
offices, covering 43 of 75 districts in Nepal. By converting salaries into commissions of 3% and increasing 
the daily collections to Rp10-500 (further increased to Rp50-500 as of 4/1998), H. B. Pradhananga was 
able to reduce the number of collectors to 98, collecting Rs10,000-15,000 each per day and serving 52,000 
depositors.  
 
4.  ...with innovative microsavings and microcredit products 
Savings contracts are for three years: a novelty in a country largely devoid of term finance. Savings 
products include one for savings collected at doorsteps at 7% interest p.a. and one of savings deposited at 
the office at 11%. Loan products comprise collateral-free loans for saving-participants and collateralized 
loans for others: 2-year business loans of Rp100,000-2m at 21% interest; 2- to 5-year agricultural loans of 
Rp10-500,000 at 15-19% p.a.; 2 - to 5 -year housing loans of Rp0.1-3m at 20-21%; 2 -year vehicle hire-
purchase loans of Rp50-150,000 at 24% p.a.; and personal loans up to 50% of accumulated savings at 
interest rates 3% above the respective savings interest rates. The share capital of HSFC as of 4/1998 is 
Rp100m ($1.6m): earned within a 10-year period. As savings mobilization in finance companies is limited 
to ten times the share capital, H.B.P. plans to transform the finance company into a bank for which no 




Formal and Nonformal Finance and the Linkage Banking Strategy 
 
  Reducing transaction costs through linkages:  The linkage strategy focuses on 
self-help groups as grassroots financial intermediaries between banks and the vast numbers of 
microentrepreneurs and small farmers to cut down on transaction costs for both banks and 
customers. The linkage strategy usually encompasses measures of upscaling nonformal financial 
institutions and the downscaling of banks as well as the adoption of sound practices. 
 
  Guiding principles:  The following guiding principles have emerged from the 
implementation in an increasing number of Asian countries, among them India, Indonesia, the 
Philippines and Thailand: 
 
  n Working through existing formal and nonformal institutions 
  n Respecting the autonomy of participating institutions 
  n Promoting savings mobilization 
  n Promoting credit delivery at market rates 
  n Linking savings and credit 
  n Repeat loans growing in size with each successful repayment cycle 
  n Using appropriate forms of collateral and collateral substitutes, incl. group liability and 
nonformal collateral  
  n Ensuring institutional viability 
  n Covering the risk from the margin 
  n Promoting sound banking practices  
 
  Participative process resulting in differentiated schemes:  The linkage strategy is 
designed to participatively initiate linkage processes, rather than prescribe specific models. Any 
specific schemes are to be the outcome of participative processes among the respective 
participants. Each bank, GO and self-help group is free to negotiate their own scheme with their 
business partners. This may result in a multitude of schemes in a given country. 
 
  The evolution of linkage schemes:  Institutional linkages between banks and SHGs 
may proceed in an evolutionary sequence of three steps: from indirect linkages mediated by 
NGOs to direct linkages and ultimately  to direct access of microentrepreneurs to banking 
services. Between these stages, there may be intermediate steps, with NGOs or SHGs, 
respectively, in a consultative role.  
 
  World Bank assessment:  In the 1989 World Development Report linkage banking 
was recommended as a promising strategy of financial system development: Informal financial 
institutions have proved able to serve the household, agricultural, and microenterprise 
sectors on a sustained basis. Measures that link informal institutions to the formal 
financial system will improve that service and ensure a competitive environment (p. iv; cf. 
p. 119). Through APRACA and AFRCA, the approach has spread to an increasing number of 




Linking banks and self-help groups 
 
1.  The unsustainability of subsidized targeted credit 
Rural finance in India has been the mandate of NABARD, the National Bank for Agriculture and 
Rural Development. Since 1980 NABARD has provided $2b in subsidized targeted credit through 
150,000 primary lending institutions for 49 million rural household. Repayment performance was dismal. 
Well into the 1980s the rural interest rate structure was inverted, with deposit rates exceeding interest 
rates on loans, undermining savings mobilization and institutional self-reliance. In the early 1990s 
Regional Rural Banks charged 10% on loans under the NABARD program: 13.9% below the average 
break-even rate of interest, thus undermining institutional viability. Despite massive subsidies, vast 
numbers of the rural poor remained beyond the reach of the government programs. In addition it was 
found that large volumes of credit were obtained by the wrong people at the wrong time for the wrong 
purpose. During the 1990s the Indian government has been revamping its development policies in the 
direction of a market economy.  
 
2.  Formal and nonformal financial institutions establish commercial business relations 
In this context, NABARD, together with the Reserve Bank of India, RBI, decided to experiment with 
linkage banking, which APRACA had  been propagating among its member institutions since 1987. 
Inspired by the design of the linkage banking project in Indonesia, NABARD adopted its chief 
principles of working through existing institutions (banks, self-help groups and NGOs, with NABARD 
in the role of lender of last resort), institutional autonomy (with participating institutions working out 
their own business terms and conditions), institutional viability (through cost coverage from the interest 
rate margin for all participating institutions) and self-reliance (through savings mobilization). During the 
test phase, the number of participating self-help groups (SHGs) grew from 255 in 1992/93 to 620 in 
1993/94 and 2,112 in 1994/95. During the first two years of national implementation, the number of 
SHGs grew to 4,757 in 1995/96 and 8,598 in 1996/97: 13% of them linked directly with banks without 
facilitation by NGOs, another 45% linked with banks with NGOs as facilitators, and 42% linked with 
NGOs as financial intermediaries. As of 31 March 1997, 120 banks and 220 NGOs were involved: still 
a minute fraction of the banking and NGO sectors in India. Presumably due to NGO influence, 76% of 
the SHGs are women‘s groups.  
 
3.  Linkage banking: a commercially viable program 
RBI has declared linkage banking a regular banking program in India, authorizing banks to lend to 
unregistered SHGs, and SHGs to accept savings deposits from their members. RBI has also moved 
away from interest rate regulation. The interest spread of participating banks and NGOs averages 
5.5% p.a. SHGs charge around 2% per month to end-users, with some going as high as 3-4% per 
month. Questioned about what appears as exorbitant interest rates by preferential credit standards, 
SHG members cited the standard moneylender interest rate of 10% per month and indicated that the 
interest earnings are ploughed back into the SHG loan fund, thus increasing access to credit from their 
own internal resources on an increasing scale. With bank loans disbursed amounting to $3.38m and a 
volume of $3.04m of NABARD refinancing, the scheme is still of a modest size by Indian standards. 
Yet NABARD considers some of the program‘s features remarkably successful and worth emulating: 
a considerable increase in rural savings; a reduction in bank transaction costs by 40%; a substantial 






The strategy of establishing new institutions   
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  Infrastructural innovation as a residual strategy:  Infrastructural innovation, i.e. the 
establishment of  new local financial institutions, can be an appropriate approach where no 
suitable institutions exist or existing institutions cannot be adjusted to local requirements. If 
approaches of institutional adaptation, upgrading or linkage banking are found inadequate in 
coping with local demands, infrastructural innovation can also serve as a complementary or 
competitive strategy and contribute to institutional differentiation.  
 
  Requirements:  There are three basic requirements for viable and sustainable 
institutional innovations in microfinance on a competitive market:  
 
  n they should be demand-driven, i.e. respond to felt needs and articulated demands for 
financial services by microentrepreneurs, small farmers, women and the poor;  
  n they should be savings-driven, both in the interest of institutions and their customers as 
savers;  
  n they should cover their costs from the margin.  
 
  Great care is to be taken that governments or donors do not subvert any of these 
principles. There are three types of institutions which are likely to meet these requirements: (1) 
community-based financial institutions which are owned and controlled by a local community; (2) 
member-based financial institutions which are cooperatively owned and controlled by their 
members; and (3) privately owned financial institutions, such as local shareholding banks. Mixed 
ownership is also possible.  
 
  Initiatives:  Depending on national and local circumstances new institutions may be 
established in the formal, semiformal or informal financial sectors. New formal financial 
institutions may be initiated by the central bank or by major national, regional or provincial banks, 
including development banks and banks with a rural mandate, as facilitators or intermediaries. 
They may be seconded by well-prepared NGOs in their capacity as training and consultancy 
agencies. New semiformal financial institutions which include cooperatives and GO and NGO-
supported financial programs, may be established through cooperative or NGO networks and 
apex organizations which need to be adequately qualified for that task. Group-based informal 
financial institutions may be set up in cooperation with NGOs and cooperatives, usually through 
their respective networks and apexes, which in turn have to provide adequate training and 
facilities to their member institutions. Under favorable conditions government institutions may 
also succeed in establishing financial self-help groups. Private financial institutions may be set up 
by any number of private local people with variable share capital contributions; among their co-
owners may also be self-help groups. 
 
  Phasing:  In any of these cases, infrastructural innovation should be planned and 
implemented with a view towards the other three institutional strategies as complementary or 
successive strategies: 
 
  (1) In countries with an inappropriate policy environment and deplete of adaptable 
institutions intervention may start with infrastructural innovations at the informal or 
semiformal level;  
  (2) to be followed in another phase by upscaling within the nonformal framework;  
  (3) next by infrastructural upgrading of the most successful institutions to semiformal 
institutions or banks;  
  (4) then by linkages between nonformal and formal institutions;  




3 approach: Strategies for providing sustainable microfinancial 
services  
 
  Scope and applicability in inappropriate environments:   The sustainability of 
microfinancial services hinges on two factors: (1) the mobilization of internal resources and (2) 
the soundness of financial practices. To some extent, sound practices can be applied in any 
policy environment and by any type of financial institution, be it formal or nonformal. A 
successful institutional adaptation strategy must encompass a sound practices strategy. This 
comprises improved or new financial products, good procedures and effective contractual terms 
and conditions. Certain, but not all sound practices such as cost coverage from the margin, will 
depend on the policy environment; but in government-approved niches or in the nonformal sector 
virtually any practice can be implemented regardless of the regulatory environment.  
 
  Internal resource mobilization:  Own internal resource mobilization makes 
microfinance institutions independent of government and donor funding. It provides a solid basis 
for the sustainability of microfinancial services. Major resources include share capital, savings 
deposits and retained profits. For MFIs operating in the microeconomy, high interest or profit-
sharing rates on loans are sometimes more effective an instrument of internal resource 
mobilization than savings deposits.  
 
                                                                 
3   The World Bank has introduced the term  best practices. This term evokes the notion of optimal 
practices applicable anywhere. In contract, experience has shown that sound practices vary by 






Transforming an unsustainable credit program into viable microfinance institutions 
 
1.  From unsustainable agricultural development banking operations... 
Since 1975 the Agricultural Development Bank of Nepal, ADBN, has built up its Small Farmer 
Development Project, SFDP: a subsidized credit program targeted at the poor: 70% of the population. 
Major donors were IFAD ($27.5m) and ADB-Manila ($30m). By mid-1996 SFDP had reached 
189,000 heads of households in some 23,000 small farmer groups. Credit disbursement and technical 
support were administered through 422 SFDP offices. With repayment rates since its inception barely 
above 40% and loss ratios fluctuating in the 20-30% range, the program incurred substantial losses. 
With a savings mobilization rate of less than 1% throughout is existence, it fully depended on donor 
resources. As a subsidized targeted credit program, SFDP turned out to be unviable and unsustainable. 
 
2.  ...to local MFIs 
With TA from GTZ, ADBN started an experiment in 1993, turning the SFDP operations of four offices 
in Dhading, one of the poorest districts of Nepal, into four Small Farmers Cooperatives Ltd., SFCLs, 
owned and managed by their members. Each comprises on average 709 small farmers in 100 groups 
(73% of them male or mixed and 27% female) organized in turn in 11 intergroups. This transformation 
has achieved a miracle: The SFCLs started mobilizing their own resources, which reached 20% of all 
loans outstanding within the first two years of their existence; the repayment rate of ADBN channeling 
loans virtually doubled to 79%; and the repayment rate of loans from internal resources jumped to 98% 
as of 7/1995. When I visited one of them, SFCL Chatredeurali, in early 1998, 70% of the loans 
outstanding had been disbursed from internal resources. 
 
3.  The challenge of institutional autonomy and sustainability 
After the successful completion of the experiment, ADBN has now entered into the phase of national 
implementation of the transformation program. By January 1998 the operations of 53 SFDP offices had 
been converted into autonomous SFLCs, with a total outreach of 31,481 families (representing a 
population of about 200,000), Rs23.6m ($0.37m at the current exchange rate) internal resources and 
Rs271.0m ($4.3m) loans outstanding. While ADBN continues to establish new small farmer groups 
through its existing network of SFDP offices which will eventually be converted into SFCLs, it is 
planned that within six years about 4-500 SFCLs will have been established with an outreach of more 
than 200,000 predominantly poor families (i.e.,. a population of 1.2 million). Given their low level of 
transaction costs and the excellent repayment performance, their viability seems to be secure. 
However, full institutional autonomy, independence from local political interference, self-reliance 
(including the cessation of loan channeling on ADBN's terms), appropriate supervision and the 
establishment of an apex structure are among the many issues that need to be assured if the SFCL are 
to fully evolve into a self-sustained movement with an ever-increasing deepening of financial services 
to the rural poor. The significance of this experiment extends far beyond SFDP. Many government-




  Microsavings:    Savings products and innovations to be promoted may comprise 
convenient deposit facilities for the accumulation and safeguarding of savings for microenterprise 
self-financing, consumption and emergencies; positive real returns to prevent erosion by inflation; 
savings products that differ in yield, maturity and incentive structure, such as voluntary savings 
withdrawable at any time or fixed deposits vs. regular compulsory savings that are 
non-withdrawable, lottery savings, raffles, etc.; and collection services organized by institutions 
or customers, such as doorstep daily savings collection, which differentially distribute transaction  
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costs. In small local MFIs, high interest rates on loans may serve as a major mechanism of self-
imposed compulsory savings mobilization. 
 
  In subsistence agriculture and marginal informal sector activities, where virtually any 
type of credit may be inappropriate, savings promotion that strengthens the self-financing 
capacity of small farmers and microentrepreneurs may be the only responsible financial 
strategy. 
 
  Microcredit:  Microcredit products may be appropriately differentiated in terms of 
maturities, instalments, services and collateral requirements (ranging from joint liability and 
personal guarantees to tangible collateral and pawning), rather than in terms of loan purpose, 
which is costly to appraise and, for fungibility reasons, difficult to control. Viable and sustainable 
microcredit schemes require: prudent adjustment to household savings, investment and 
repayment capacities; small loan sizes, with ceilings growing over a cycle of repeat loans up to a 
level determined by the absorptive capacity of the microenterprise and household economy; 
dynamically growing savings-to-credit ratios; market rates of interest autonomously determined 
by financial institutions and differentiated according to costs and services provided; loan 
maturities and repayment modalities according to customer needs and differentiated, in case of 
wholesaling, according for each level of intermediation; short maturities, no g race periods and 
short instalment periods in case of initial loans; insistence on, and incentives for, timely 
repayment; and the development and provision of cost-effective monitoring systems.  
 
  Microinsurance:  Microinsurance is the most underdeveloped part of microfinance. 
Yet various schemes exist that are viable, benefiting both the institutions and their clients. Such 
schemes have generally served two major purposes: (1) they have contributed to loan security; 
and (2) they have served as instruments of resource mobilization.  
 
  On a modest scale, various forms of life and health insurance have been successfully 
practiced by different institutions in different countries, particularly as part of loan protection 
schemes (e.g., by credit unions). There are also successful examples of accident insurance and 
cattle insurance (e.g. by ADBN-SFDP, Nepal). There are virtually no cases of viable crop 
insurance schemes. 
 
  Product reciprocity:  Product reciprocity, ties credit to savings and insurance. It 
lessens moral hazard and improves financial discipline. For otherwise unbankable customers, it 
establishes a track record. To banks, it offers a cost-effective solution to the information 
problem.  
 
  Collection reciprocity:  Through collection reciprocity an institution may combine the 
collection of savings with the collection of instalments, which can be crucial to arrears prevention 
in the informal sector where incomes are daily or irregular, but not monthly, and are likely to 
escape collection without appropriate timing and collection techniques. 
 
  Tied lending:  Recovery rates can be further improved by tied lending, which interlinks 
credit with commodity transactions, which are widespread in the nonformal sector but may also 
be successfully applied by formal institutions. 
 
  Microfinance procedures and services:  They should be set by financial institutions 
rather than government; be customer-oriented, i.e. simple, fast and on time; be market-oriented 
and in competition with those by other formal or nonformal institutions; and cover their cost. 
Appropriate procedures and services should be applied to attain (1) sound financial management, 
(2) convenient and safe savings collection and deposit facilities, (3) appropriate loan appraisal  
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and processing procedures,  (4) adequate risk management (including collateral substitutes, 
nonformal collateral, loan protection schemes and prudent loan disbursement), (5) timely 
repayment collection, (6) monitoring and (7) effective information gathering, all of which may 
include cooperation between different formal and nonformal intermediaries in fields where each 
is most effective. 
 
  Terms and conditions:  Financial contracts must be sound from both an institution's 
and its customers' viewpoints. To arrive at balanced loan contracts, an exchange of experience 
and mutual learning may be required between the various types of nonformal and formal 
institutions including: (1) informal financial institutions with their wide range of contractual terms 
concerning interest rates, loan s izes, maturities, grace periods, loan purposes, reciprocities, 
collateral requirements, services, transaction cost sharing arrangements and unbounded 
innovations; (2) semiformal financial institutions including projects and programs, which tend to 
be influenced by governmental or non-governmental donors and frequently combine 
comprehensive services  with a lack of commercial orientation; (3) formal institutions on tightly 
regulated markets, with a narrow and usually inflexible range of contractual terms; and (4) 
formal institutions on deregulated markets with their much wider range of terms, transaction cost 
sharing arrangements and innovations.  
 
  Ultimately savers and borrowers must be regarded as a market for financial institutions: 
with the institutions  as intermediaries, and savers and borrowers as customers rather than 
beneficiaries. Contractual terms and conditions on that market are the result of negotiation and 
competition rather than administrative imposition and convenience. 